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matter in the controversy, it seems to us es-
sential to a fair trial that every fact which
would throw any light upon its truth or falsity
should be submitted to the jury. The state in-
sists that the testimony with reference to de-
fendant's confession of implication in the mur-
der of Mr. and Mrs. Jones is too removed in
point of time to be of any weight, and it must
be remembered that the subject of investiga-
tion is the mental condition and peculiarities
of defendant, that the motive for.the confes-
sion is material, and that the peculiar mental
bias, weakness or tendency may extend for a
lifetime. There is often a persistency in both
mental and physical habits that is remarkable,
and a defective mind may continue after the
childhood stage. The defendant stood charged
with a crime punishable by the extreme pen-
alty of the law. If he is a degenerate or de-
fective, there is the more reason for care and.
caution that every provision which the law
offers for the protection of those accused of
crime should be allowed. There are numerous
cases upon record where men have volun-
tarily confessed themselves to be guilty of
atrocious crimes, where investigation has
proved their innocence, and. the confession
could only be attributed to a defective or ab-
normal mentality. This is said, not as indicat-
ing or expressing any opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant, but merely to
emphasize the necessity of extreme care to
allow the accused full opportunity to make his
defense.
"After a careful consideration of all the testi-
mony in the record, we are satisfied that with-
out the confession there is not sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the conviction. The most im-
portant inquiry therefore-the vital question
in the case is-what weight and value should
be given to the confession as evidence. To
determine this, all the testimony bearing upon
defendant's physical and mental condition, both
at the time of the confession and before, and
tendencies which he may have inherited, his
manner of life, and the fact that he confessed
to other homicides of which he could not have
been guilty, should all be taken into considera-
tion. We are of opinion that evidence as to
any fact occurring during the life of this de-
fendant which is in any way calculated to
throw light upon the credibility of his confes-
sion is material to the issue, should have been
submitted to the jury, and that it was preju-
dicial to his rights to exclude it."
OUR GAME OF LEGAL
PROCEDURE.
Is our system of legal procedure in the
United States merely a system for the ad-
ministration of justice, or is it chiefly a
most wonderful game? Is there anyone
in this country who still thinks our legal
procedure is much more than a game?
If so, he needs disillusioning! Let him
observe how our legal procedure fulfills
all the requirements of a great game, but
lacks many of the fundamental require-
ments for the administration of justice.
The rules of the game are classified as
the rules of pleading, the rules of evi-
dence, the rules of trial practice, and
the rules of appellate practice. Our game
of legal procedure originated in early
English history, and has been a most
popular game ever since its origination.
During all the centuries that it has been
played, the rules of the game have been
increasing in number, until, at the present
time, they are so numerous that it takes
many large volumes to contain them all,
and it takes a lifetime for a player or an
official to learn them all. From time to
time the public has assailed the game for
its brutality, and as a consequence the
rules of the game have been modified:
this occurred in the reforms accomplished
first by equity procedure and later by
the code procedure; but none of the re-
forms have essentially changed the style
of play of the old game or spoiled the
game as a sport.
According to the rules of the game, the
officials are one umpire, three to nine
referees (varying with the jurisdiction
where the game is played) and twelve
linesmen. The umpire is popularly
known as the trial judge. He is chosen
from the ranks of captains or of coaches,
and he generally has- had a good deal of
experience either as a captain or a coach,
though this is not a necessary require-
ment. The umpire officiates during the
second and third quarters of a game. The
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referees are commonly known as the
judges of the supreme court. They are
chosen most frequently from the um-
pires, but this is not a requirement. The
referees officiate only in the fourth quar-
ter of a game. The linesmen are called
the jury. They act, if at all, during the
third quarter of the game. Both umpires
and referees are supposed to be learned
in the rules of the game, may know the
players, and are allowed to know a little
substantive law, but if the linesmen know
anything or anybody connected with the
game they are subject to disqualification
by challenge.
The game is played by two teams, one
known as the plaintiff's and the other as
the defendant's team, or side. Each team
is made up of the following players: law-
yers, clients, and witnesses. The captain
is always a lawyer. The captain is the
conspicuous player on his side. He de-
cides what plays shall be used, gives the
signals for the other players, and does
most of the playing himself. The captain
may have other lawyers associated.with
him as sub-captains. The clients may be
one or more. The witnesses may be any
number. As a consequence, teams often
seem to be unevenly matched. Two or
three men are sometimes matched against
as many as twenty or thirty. The larger
team does not have the advantage that it
would seem to have from its numbers,
because under the rules of the game, mass
plays have always been prohibited.
The rules of eligibility are simple. Any-
one may be a client. at any time. All
that anyone has to do if he wants to play
a game of legal procedure, if he is willing
to play as a client, is to sue someone. He
may choose anyone he likes and compel
him to play with him. T he result is that
practically everyone gets into the game
in some fashion at least once during his
lifetime. The fascination of the game
is such that more people would play more
frequently were it not for a wise pro-
vision of the rules that if a client does
not win he must pay the costs of the
suit. Were it not for this provision, most
citizens would probably spend all of their
time in doing nothing but playing this
most exciting and alluring game. Any-
body may be a witness provided he is
chosen by the captain. The client has
the privilege of choosing his lawyer for
captain, but after he is once chosen, the
captain has all the privileges. No one is
eligible to be a captain, unless a client de-
sires to be his own captain, until he has
been admitted to practice. The eligibil-
ity committee, which passes upon the
different applicants for admission to prac-
tice, is known as the Board of Bar Ex-
aminers. Each state in the union has a
different-board, and the requirements of
the various boards are not uniform. These
requirements relate to character, scholar-
ship, length of preliminary study and ex-
perience, but the only requirement which
has been enforced at all up to date is the
scholarship requirement, and it has not
been difficult to evade this up to date.
Our game of legal procedure is a pro-
fessional game. The lawyers are always
professionals, and the other players are
professionals if the team can afford them.
It would be out of the question for the
position of captain to be played by ama-
teurs. The rules of the game are so nu-
merous and technical, the possible plays
are so many and so complicated, and the
ability to follow the issue requires so
much skill and experience, that profes-
sionals are absolutely needed. Hence cap-
tains are always paid for playing, and
are also carefully coached. The fees
which the captains shall receive are regu-
lated by themselves. Since the lawyers
have a practical monopoly on the game,
their charges are frequently quite exor-
bitant, but more frequently their charges
are quite reasonable for though lawyers
have a monopoly as to all other people
in the community, the competition among
themselves for the positions of captains
has become very fierce, owing to the
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overcrowding of the profession by the
laxity of the boards of bar examiners.
The regular coaches of the captains are
the law school teachers, but a great deal
of irregular coaching is done by the old
lawyers who are interested in the young-
er players. It is the business of the
coaches to tiain the captains in all of the
t ricks, schemes, positions, motions, and
all other plays, both offensive and de-
fensive, permitted by the myriad rules of
pleading-, evidence, and trial and appellate
practice.
The game of legal procedure is played
on a field called a court room, which is
laid out so as to give a certain place for
the umpires and referees, linesmen, wit-
nesses, clients, and lawyers, and also with
seats where the public may watch the
game if it desires. Sometimes crowds
throng our court rooms so that many have
to be turned away, but generally the in-
terest in the game is confined to the
players and the officials.
The players do not have a ball with
which to play in the game of legal pro-
cedure, but they have an intellectual sub-
stitute with which they play that in many
respects resembles the material ball with
which athletic teams play. T his pro-
cedural ball is a thing called "the issue."
It is the issue which has made it possible
to develop such a game as we have in
our legal procedure. Were it not for the
issue, legal procedure would not be a
game. All of the rules of pleading relate
to the forming of the issue. The rules of
evidence are for the purpose of keeping
the issue between the two sides. A great
captain is one who can always keep his
eye on the issue, and is able to follow it
through the entire game. Umpires and
referees are principally concerned with
deciding whether a captain has fumbled
the issue, or passed the issue, or done
something else with the issue. Delays
and reversals and other tricks of practice
are pulled off by means of the issue.
The game of legal procedure consists
of four quarters. However, the rules do
not require the teams to play four quar-
ters. A game of legal procedure may
end at any time. Whenever an opponent
gives up and admits defeat, the game is
ended. It sometimes happens that *the
plaintiff wins the game on the kick-off,
that is after making his first pleading.
However, if an opponent does not admit
defeat, the game regularly proceeds
through four quarters and is ended by
the judgment of the referees. The cap-
tain almost always prefers to play
through all four quarters, because he not
only likes to play the game but is being
paid for playing, but clients very fre-
quently are satisfied'with a shorter game.
The first quarter is the one where the
play consists of a series of pleadings.
These take place off from the field and
without any umpire present. The um-
pire decides later on, however, whether
or not any of the rules of pleading have
been violated by the captains. In the
second quarter the play is concerned
mostly with the selection of officials.
Days, and sometimes weeks, are often
spent in the selection of the linesmen, or
jury. In the third quarter the play is
concerned with the introduction of evi-
dence and preparation for appeal. This,
if any, is the spectators' quarter. If the
game has not been won on the pleadings,
a captain must make every effort to win
it on evidence. The object of a good
captain is to exclude his opponent's evi-
dence and to get in his own, and here the
work of two brilliafit and evenly matched
captains is liable to be most spectacular.
If a captain sees that he cannot win in
the third quarter, he tries to prepare his
case so that he can win in the fourth
quarter. This is done by getting error
into the record. The fourth quarter con-
sists of the appellate practice. The ref-
erees, looking only at the record given
them of the case, decide whether or not
any of the rules of the game have been
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violated, and if they find that any rules
have been violated, they reverse the deci-
sion of the umpire. Thus, it is seen, that
one team may apparently be winning in
one quarter and another team in another
quarter, and one team may be ahead up
to the last quarter and the other team
nose out a victory in the final quarter.
There are almost no penalties for rough
play, or for dirty work. The only offense
that is penalized is lack of respect for
an umpire, or referee, which is called
contempt of court, and punished by fine.
The -game of legal procedure is sup-
ported by the contributions of the clients,
and by the money paid by the public in
the form of taxation. The clients pay the
salaries of the captains. The public pays
for the officials and for the maintenance
of the grounds. In other words, an ex-
travagant and duped public is paying for
a game which it seldom shares or wit-
nesses.
There is no denying the fact that the
game of legal procedure is a areat game.
It is the greatest game on earth ! No foot-
ball -game ever excelled it in the excite-
ment of play. For every wonderful play
upon the gridiron, there is a more won-
derful play in the court room. On the
football field we see beautiful tackles, trick
plays, shift formations, beautifully ex-
ecuted forward passes, dodging runs, and
perfectly executed team play. In the
court room, under our system of proced-
ure (which is unlike every other known
to the world), the lawyers play a mental
game of ball that has tackles, and tricks,
and shift formations, and team play,
which are more wonderful than any that
will ever be seen upon the football fields.
Our game of legal procedure is intoxicat-
ing. It thrills the lawyer who is play-
ing it, and it generally thrills the client
who is paying for it. It is a good game,
but we ought not to make the mistake of
calling it a system for the administration
of justice. It administers justice no more
than it administers injustice. It is true
we have fallen into the habit of calling it
a system for the administration of jus-
tice, but let us not be deceived by the
name. Have we in truth a system for
the administration of justice?
Shall we permit our legal procedure to
continue, the great game which it is-a
game under the control of private parties
-or shall we make the administration of
justice one of the great duties if the state,
and the receipt of justice one of the great
rights of the people?
HUGH E. WILLIS.
Los Angeles, Cal.
'WILLS.-ELECTION BY DEVISEE.
LINDSLEY v. PATTERSON, et al.
Supreme Court of Missouri. June 1, 1915.
177 S. W. 826.
Where, a testator leaves property to a third
person, and also leaves such third person's prop-
erty to another, by accepting the gift from the
testator to him, the third person is estopped to
deny testator's devolution of his own property,
and must follow the commands of the will in
that respect under the doctrine of election,
which is that a person accepting a gift under a
will, deed, or contract must also accept the bur-
dens imposed thbreby, or must reject the gift.
Testatrix and her husband lived in Connecti-
cut, owning property therein, and in Missouri.
A Connecticut statute (Gen. St., Revision 1908,
§ 391) provided that a hsuband, upon death of
his wife, might elect to take under her will, or
might renounce such will and take his statutory
share of the estate. Rev. St. 1909, § 350, was
to the same effect In Missouri. The husband
elected to take under the will in Connecticut,
but thereafter filed a renunciation of such will
in Missouri. Held, that such statutes, giving the
husband an interest in his wife's estate, vested
with him a property right at the Instant of her
death, and that, when she made a devise to an-
other infringing his statutory share of the es-
tate, if he elected to take under the will the
case was proper for the application of the doc-
trine of election, and he could not take the in-
creased share'given him by the will in Connecti-
cut over his statutory share there, and there-
after in Missouri repudiate his election to take
under the will and receive his statutory share.
Statement of Facts.-The plaintiff brought
this suit in the circuit court of the city of St.
Louis, to partition three several parcels of real
estate, situate therein, valued at about $200,000.
The trial resulted in a decree In favor of the
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